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International Game Tech. v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 13 (Feb. 9, 2006)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – FALSE CLAIMS ACTION
Summary
Petitioner, Nevada’s Attorney General, appeals from the district courts’ refusals to
dismiss actions brought under Nevada’s False Claims Act (“FCA”) by respondents, James
McAndrews and Beeler, Schad & Diamond, P.C.
Nevada permits individuals to become private attorneys general, which grants individuals
the right to sue on behalf of the state. This individual is known as a quitam plaintiff. After filing
an action, the quitam plaintiff must send the Attorney General a copy of the complaint and a
written disclosure of all material information, and then the complaint is sealed. The complaint
remains sealed and the defendants are not served until the Attorney General decides whether to
intervene. From here, the Attorney General may choose to intervene and to proceed with the
action. If the Attorney General intervenes and elects to proceed with the action, the quitam
plaintiff must relinquish control of the litigation but may remain a party to the action. On the
other hand, if the Attorney General chooses not to intervene initially, the Attorney General may
still later intervene upon timely application “if the interest of the State . . . in recovery of the
money or property involved is not being adequately represented by the private plaintiff.”2 In
addition, the Attorney General may settle the action and “may move to dismiss the action for
good cause.”3
Respondent, McAndrews, filed suit under the FCA against International Game
Technology, Anchor Coin, Inc., and Spin For Cash Wide Area Progressive (“IGT”).
McAndrews filed suit because IGT allegedly falsified tax records. After receiving a copy of
McAndrew’s FCA complaint, the Nevada Attorney General asked the Nevada Department of
Taxation (“tax department”) to perform an audit of IGT. The Attorney General then elected to
intervene pursuant to NRS 357.080(4) and moved to dismiss the false claims action for several
reasons: (1) the FCA does not cover tax matters; (2) Nevada’s tax-collection preempts false
claims actions brought by private litigants based on tax deficiencies; and (3) good cause is
present in order to dismiss the action. The district court denied the Attorney General’s motion to
dismiss and held that the express language of Nevada’s FCA does not forbid tax deficiency
claims. Furthermore, the district court found that the Attorney General failed to demonstrate
good cause for dismissal because he had not demonstrated that the dismissal served a legitimate
governmental purpose.
Respondent Beeler, Schad & Diamond filed suit under the FCA against several retailers
who maintain stores or warehouses in Nevada. After receiving a copy of the complaint, the
Nevada Attorney General declined to intervene. Nevertheless, the Attorney General later moved
to intervene pursuant to NRS 357.130(2) for the purpose of filing a motion to dismiss. The
district court denied the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss and concluded that an individual
may appropriately bring tax deficiency claims under Nevada’s FCA. Again, the district court
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found that the Attorney General failed to demonstrate good cause. The Attorney General
responded by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition.
Beeler, Schad & Diamond asserted that since the Attorney General intervened later in the
course of litigation, after originally declining, the Attorney General could not move to dismiss
the action. Beeler, Schad & Diamond attempted to distinguish this from McAndrew’s situation
where, pursuant to NRS 357.120, the Attorney General could dismiss an action for good cause
because he intervened without first declining. The Nevada Supreme Court disagreed and held
that, in addition to allowing private individuals to bring false claims actions in situations where
the claim arises from a tax deficiency, the Attorney General may move to dismiss the false
claims action regardless of when he intervened.
Issue and Disposition
Issue
(1) Does Nevada’s FCA provide for a private individual to bring a false claims action in
situations where the claim arises from a tax deficiency?
(2) If the Attorney General initially declines to intervene but later decides to intervene,
does this affect whether he may later move to dismiss the false claims action?
Disposition
(1) Yes. In contrast to federal legislation, Nevada’s FCA includes language that allows
for a reverse false claims action but omits language that would forbid an individual
from bringing a false claims action arising from a tax deficiency. However, a court
must nevertheless engage in a burden-shifting analysis articulated in Laraway v.
Sutro & Co., Inc.,4 which provides that a court must use rational basis scrutiny and
decide whether the dismissal of an action brought under the FCA would serve a
legitimate state interest.
(2) No. Neither NRS 357.120 nor NRS 357.130 provides that a court may consider the
Attorney General’s motion to dismiss only after he has initially intervened, and
federal courts have construed similar language in the federal FCA as allowing the
government to move to dismiss a false claims action after initially declining to
intervene.
Commentary
State of the Law before International Game
Prior to International Game, the Nevada Supreme Court had not addressed the issues of
whether Nevada’s FCA provided for a private individual to bring a false claims action in a
situation where the claim arose from a tax deficiency and whether the Attorney General could
move to dismiss a false claims action after initially declining to intervene. However, the Ninth
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Circuit had addressed the issue of whether the Attorney General could move to dismiss a false
claim action in United States v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp. (Sequoia).5 The Ninth Circuit
recognized that the government’s ability to move for dismissal of a false claims action is broad
but not unrestricted.6 The court likened the government’s ability to move for dismissal to its
prosecutorial discretion to enforce laws and determined that a court must engage in a rational
basis analysis.7 Therefore, the government’s actions must be rationally related to achieving a
valid government purpose. Laraway additionally recognized that in interpreting California’s
FCA, the courts must interpret the meaning of “good cause” through statutory construction.8
Other Jurisdictions
As mentioned above, the Ninth Circuit and California courts have recognized that the
government’s ability to move for dismissal of a false claims action is broad and that the courts
must interpret the government’s ability to move for dismissal of a false claims action by
examining the language of the statute.
In addition to examining the Ninth Circuit and California interpretations of false claim
statutes, the Nevada Supreme Court looked to federal law for guidance on the issue of whether
Nevada’s FCA allows a private individual to bring a false claims action when the claim arises
from a tax deficiency. Congress intended that the FCA apply to all types of fraud that would
cause the government to lose money. When Congress originally enacted the FCA, it did not
include any language permitting a person to bring a false claims action on behalf of the
government. Furthermore, the federal Internal Revenue Code authorized against private suits on
behalf of the government.
In 1986, however, Congress amended the FCA to allow for reverse false claims actions
by private citizens. At the same time, Congress recognized that the reverse false claims
provision would provide for tax deficiency claims, and Congress responded to this by explicitly
barring tax claims in the federal FCA. Therefore, under federal law, a private citizen may not
bring a false claims action in situations where the claims arise from tax deficiencies.
Effect of International Game on Current Law
International Game clarifies that the Nevada FCA differs slightly from the federal FCA
in that private individuals may bring false claims actions in situations where the claims arise
from tax deficiencies because the Nevada FCA does not explicitly provide otherwise.
Furthermore, International Game clarifies that Nevada, like other states and the federal
government, will allow the Attorney General to move for dismissal when he or she has good
cause even though he or she initially declined to intervene in the false claims action.
Conclusion
Private individuals may bring false claims actions pursuant to Nevada’s FCA in situations
where the claims arise from tax deficiencies. In addition, the Attorney General may initially
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decline to intervene and may still move to dismiss a false claims action when he eventually
chooses to intervene. In determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss, a court must
engage in a burden-shifting analysis articulated in Laraway, which provides that a court must use
rational basis scrutiny and decide whether the dismissal of an action brought under the FCA
would serve a legitimate state interest.
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